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Strategic Outsourcing with Technology Transfer under Price Competition 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We construct a model to show that outsourcing of a crucial input can occur even though it 
can be produced in-house at a lower cost. There are two firms producing differentiated goods 
and competing in prices, and only one of them possesses input production technology which 
is superior to that of an independent input supplier. We show that if the degree of product 
differentiation is small or the technological gap between two input producing firms is small, 
strategic outsourcing will occur. Technology transfer in the form of patent sale will act as a 
commitment that the firm will outsource. While the outsourcing firm gains, consumers’ 
welfare as well as social welfare goes down. Interestingly, sometimes rival firm’s profit 
might increase. The paper brings into focus some competition policy concerns. 
JEL Classifications: D43; L22; L23; L24. 
Keywords: outsourcing; patent transfer; price competition; welfare; competition policy.      
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1. Introduction 
Outsourcing is a widespread phenomenon in modern business. Almost all firms and business 
houses are involved in outsourcing activities. In the last two decades the outsourcing 
activities are growing over 30% per annum. Nokia, for example, depends on more than 300 
domestic subcontractors and similar number of foreign subcontractors. In computer industry 
Sun purchases about 75% of components from other companies. The aircraft giant Boeing 
outsources products of over 34000 components from different manufacturers for its 
production of 747 passenger aircraft. The 1998 Annual Report of WTO estimate shows that 
only 37% of the production value of a representative American car is generated domestically 
in the US. A little search in the internet will reveal many more such information. Recently, 
R&D outsourcing is also growing fast.
1
  
What is outsourcing? Broadly speaking, it refers to a contracting made by a firm with another 
firm or organization regarding performing of some business function (viz., input production) 
which is ultimately purchased back as a service. So outsourcing decision is the outcome of 
the choice problem between in-house production of inputs within the vertical structure of the 
firm and buying inputs from outside decentralized market sources. The traditional literature 
mostly focuses on cost consideration; accordingly, if a firm can buy an input from outside at 
a price lower than its in-house cost of production, it is reasonable that the firm will go for 
outsourcing of production of such an input.
2
 It is in this context that we raise the question as 
to whether outsourcing of a crucial input can occur even when the in-house production cost is 
lower.  
Motivation behind the question is the following. In an imperfectly competitive market 
structure how a firm will organize its production and whether it will buy some crucial inputs 
from outside instead of producing in-house are the outcomes of the subtle and complex 
                                                           
1
 See Beladi et al. (2012), for instance. 
2
 The literature on the theory of firm defines the boundaries and limitations of vertical and horizontal extension 
of a firm. This leads to the choice of production organization based on cost consideration. The problem is 
explained in terms of transaction costs, specificity of factors, incomplete contracting and property rights. One 
may look at the works of Coase (1937), Grossman and Hart (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1999, 2002), Hart 
and Moore (1990), Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and Williamson (1985). Gibbons (2005) provides a nice 
survey on the theory of firm.  
 
 3    
 
decisions involving significant strategic considerations. Here `cost’ is not the only 
consideration; it is not then surprising that a firm might outsource a key input from an outside 
supplier even though the input can be produced cheaply in-house. In this paper we focus on 
such a scenario of outsourcing. There are in fact evidences to show that a firm outsources 
crucial inputs even when its in-house production is less expensive. For example, the aircraft 
giant Boeing had entered into a series of outsourcing agreements with three Japanese firms 
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., and Fuji heavy Industries) 
regarding supply of some goods related to aircraft production, including R&D, during 2000s 
when these firms showed interest in entering the market for commercial aircrafts. It was 
observed that costs in Japan were no less, hence Boeing’s outsourcing decision cannot be 
justified based on cost-saving. Outsourcing contracts between Boeing and Lockheed is 
another example.
3
 
We analyze the problem of outsourcing vs. in-house production in a setting where two firms 
produce differentiated products and compete in prices in a Bertrand fashion, but only one of 
them (say, firm 1) has the relevant input production technology to produce a crucial input. 
There is a third firm (call firm 0) which cannot compete in the final goods market but 
possesses an input producing technology. Hence both firm 0 and firm 1 can compete in the 
input market for selling the input to firm 2, the other product market competitor. Assume that 
firm 1 possesses a superior input production technology compared to that of firm 0, but both 
firm 1 and firm 2 have symmetric final goods producing technology. In this setting we 
analyze the decision of firm 1 between outsourcing the input from the independent input 
suppler and producing it in-house. Since firm 1 has lower cost of in-house input production, 
in the absence of any strategic consideration firm 1 would never like to outsource the input 
production.  But since firm 1 possesses the superior technology, it has the option to sell out 
its patent of the superior technology to the independent input producer. The sale of patent 
entails that once the patent is sold, firm 1 foregoes rights to produce inputs for itself, and the 
independent input producer emerges as monopolist in the input market. Thus firm 1 can 
induce the input supplier to charge a monopoly price for inputs to all product market 
competitors. Firm 1 can overcompensate the loss of profits due to the higher input price by 
means of charging a fee for the transferred technology. The higher input price also relaxes 
                                                           
3
 See in Chen (2011). 
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product market competition. We show that such strategic outsourcing of input production is 
profitable to the outsourcing firm if either the degree of product differentiation is small or the 
technological gap between two firms producing inputs is not large. On the other hand, in-
house production is optimal if the degree of product substitution is small but the 
technological asymmetry is sufficiently large.  
In the present paper we thoroughly examine the implications of the possibility of outsourcing. 
We find that strategic outsourcing always reduces consumers’ welfare as well as overall 
welfare. However, under outsourcing equilibrium the overall industry profit will be higher 
when the goods are relatively close substitutes but lower when the goods are highly 
differentiated. Our model is closely related to the idea of raising rivals’ costs as illustrated in 
Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987). However, in the standard literature on raising rival’s cost 
the rival is adversely affected. On the contrary, surprisingly in our model we show that the 
rival’s profit may be higher even though firm 1’s outsourcing strategy raises input cost for 
firm 2. This brings into focus that both firms might like the outsourcing arrangement 
although the society as a whole will be worse off. Thus it is desirable for the competition 
authority to carefully scrutinize the transfer of low cost input production technology, which is 
otherwise an encouraging phenomenon for the society.  
There are a number of works which focus on strategic outsourcing.
4
 Among these, one paper 
which is very closely related to ours is by Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2008a). They 
have constructed a three-firm model with one wholesale input supplier and two product 
market competitors, of which one firm, say firm 1 has capability to produce the input in-
house but the other firm has only output production technology. The paper shows that even 
though firm 1 can produce the input at a cost less than the input price charged by the whole 
sale input supplier, firm 1 will outsource to gain strategic advantage. The whole seller decides 
the prices to be charged to firm 1 and firm 2 sequentially. Then firm 1 by its strategic 
outsourcing decision can induce a higher input price for its product market rival, and in the 
extreme this might deter entry of the rival. Our paper is different from theirs on many counts. 
First and foremost, Arya et al. (2008a) does not have the possibility of technology transfer 
                                                           
4
 See, for instance, Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Buchler and Haucap (2006), Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington 
(2008a, 2008b), Chen, Dubey and Sen (2011), Chen (2011), and Mukherjee and Tsai (2010, 2013). A brief 
outline of these works can be found in Kabiraj (2013). 
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whereas in our paper it acts as the motivating factor for outsourcing. Second, in our model in 
case of outsourcing the monopoly input supplier does not discriminate input prices, but price 
discrimination with sequential offer is a feature in Arya et al. model. Third, in our case when 
firm 1, with having a superior technology of input production, decides to produce the input 
in-house, not only it produces for itself but also it sells inputs in equilibrium to its product 
market rival. In contrast, in Arya et al. firm 2 gets inputs only from the independent input 
supplier. Another crucial assumption in their paper is that the independent input supplier 
possesses the least cost input production technology, without which outsourcing would not 
occur. But in our model firm 1 owns the superior input production technology; still 
outsourcing can be an optimal decision.  Finally, we have considered price competition in 
final goods market whereas Arya et al. assume quantity competition.
5
  
Another closely related paper is by Chen (2011), which shows that the outsourcing decision 
of an incumbent might prevent entry of a potential entrant as the incumbent can commit to an 
aggressive post entry competition. There is no entry deterrence story in our model, and the 
final goods market is always duopoly; it is the input market which becomes monopoly under 
outsourcing. Thus, our work complements the works of Arya et al. (2008a) and Chen (2011). 
However, no other paper in the literature has considered technology transfer as an integrated 
decision of the outsourcing strategy.
6
    
The rest of the paper is presented according to the following scheme. Section 2 describes the 
structure of the model and the game. Then section 3 and 4 present respectively the 
equilibrium outcomes of the decisions of in-house production and outsourcing. Section 5 
discusses the choice between outsourcing and in-house production. Section 6 provides a 
welfare analysis of our results. Then section 7 discusses some related issues. Finally, section 
8 concludes the paper.   
 
                                                           
5
 We shall also discuss the results in case the firms play Cournot in the product market (see Kabiraj and Sinha 
(2014) for details). 
6
 Two papers, viz., Pack and Saggi (2001) and Peirce and Sen (2012), have talked about technology transfer and 
outsourcing, but their focus is completely different. In Pack and Saggi, the DC firm by means of technology 
transfer buys back final goods from the LDC transferee. Given the possibility of imitation and leaking out of 
knowledge, they discuss the issues of diffusion and competition in this context. Peirce and Sen, on the other 
hand discuss strategic interactions and implications of the policies of outsourcing and technology transfer in a 
Hotelling model. 
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2. The Model  
There are three firms, two of which are competing in the product market. These product 
market competitors, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2, are producing differentiated products and 
competing in prices in a Bertrand fashion. Production of final goods, however, requires a 
non-specific key input. It is assumed that firm 1 has input production technology to produce 
the input in-house but firm 2 does not have, although both firms have knowledge to produce 
their respective final goods. The third firm, call it firm 0, is an independent input supplier 
which can produce the key input but cannot produce any final goods. It is further assumed 
that its technology is inferior to that of firm 1 in the sense that the unit cost of producing 
inputs by firm 0 is larger compared to that by firm 1. Therefore, firm 2 can get the input 
either from firm 0 or from firm 1. While final goods production may involve other inputs but 
for simplicity we normalize the cost of those inputs to be zero. So the cost of producing the 
final good is the cost of the key inputs required in production. Assume that one unit of the 
key input is required to produce one unit of output. Let 1c  and 0c  
be the unit cost of 
producing one unit of input by firm 1 and firm 0, respectively; 
010 cc <≤ . We assume that 
the input production technology of firm 1 is fully transferable by means of licensing or by 
selling out the patent of the technology with no additional cost.  
Let the market demand for final goods in inverted form, as faced by firm i , be given by
7
  
ji  2; 1,ji,   ; ≠=−−= jii qqap γ  
where γ  represents the degree of product differentiability; 0=γ  implies two goods are 
independent of each other, 1=γ  implies goods are perfect substitutes. So we assume, 
10 << γ . Without loss of generality, and to simplify calculations and expressions, we further 
assume 
  1=a  and 01 =c .  
With this the direct demand functions can be written as:  
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Game Structure 
The firms play the following three-stage game. In the first stage firm 1 decides whether it will 
sell the patent of the technology to the independent input supplier (firm 0), and accordingly 
give a take-it-or-leave-it contract.
8
 The independent input supplier will either accept or reject 
the offer.  We consider that only fixed payment from firm 0 to firm 1 would be made. Firm 
1’s option of neither selling the patent nor licensing the technology can be thought of as 
making an unacceptable offer by firm 1 to firm 0.  
In case firm 1 has sold the patent of the technology in the first stage, then in the second stage 
both the final goods producers will buy the required amount of key input at the price charged 
by the monopoly input supplier. On the other hand, if the technology is not sold and firm 1 
decides to produce the input in-house, then only firm 2 buys input from the input market and 
firm 1 and firm 0 will compete to sell inputs to firm 2. We assume that input market 
competition takes place in prices. Finally, in the third stage, firm 1 and firm 2 compete in 
prices to serve the final goods market.  
As far as the first stage decision of firm 1 is concerned, a justification for patent sale vis-a-vis 
licensing the technology is in order. Patent sale implies foregoing the right to use the 
technology any further, whereas under licensing firm 1 can retain its right to use the 
technology. Therefore, patent sale is a commitment on the part of firm 1 that firm 1 will not 
produce inputs for itself or for the market by using the technology and will have to depend on 
the independent input supplier if it wants to serve the final goods market. Thus patent sale 
will make firm 0 monopoly in the input market. This is tantamount to choosing the option of 
outsourcing the input from the independent input supplier. In case of technology licensing, on 
the other hand, firm 1 has the option of using the technology for its in-house production as 
well as producing for the input market. Then under licensing the input market will have two 
firms competing to supply inputs to firm 2, and firm 1 cannot commit to firm 0 in the 
licensing contract that it will not participate in the input market competition. We also show 
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 We can see that in the context of the present model licensing cannot occur. 
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that it is always tempting for firm 1 to sell input in the market when it is undertaking the in-
house production. Thus, given the positive incentive to breach such a contract of non 
participation in the input market, such commitment, even if written in the contract, has no 
value. When the contract is breached, the government would not be willing to enforce such a 
contract in the court of law as it is anti-competitive. Hence, in the absence of commitment 
technology licensing will not occur.  
 
3. In-house Production with Input Market Competition 
 
Both firm 1 and firm 0 own the input production technology, hence they can compete to 
supply input to firm 2. However, firm 1 has the option of not competing at all in the input 
market; if it likes, it can allow firm 0 to supply inputs alone to firm 2. But given that input 
market competition takes place in prices, and firm 1 has superior input production 
technology, it can always compete out firm 0 and grab the whole market. Then we have the 
following result. 
Proposition 1: Not competing in the input market by firm 1 cannot be a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
Proof: For any input price charged by firm 0, firm 1 can always undercut and grab the market 
for input supply to firm 2 without affecting its own product market profit. QED 
Given the above proposition, the input price will be determined through an interaction of firm 
1 and firm 0 in the input market. If firm 2 buys inputs at price 2c , the outcome of the third 
stage play will be: 
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The corresponding payoffs of firm 1 and firm 2 from the final goods market competition are: 
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We assume duopoly in the product market. Hence the input price must be below a critical 
level, that is, )(
2
1
22
γφ
γ
γ
≡
−
−<c . In our model two relevant parameters are 0c  and γ . 
Hence we restrict our analysis to the following parameter space: 
  { }1,c0    )(|),( 000 <<<=Ω γγφγ andcc                           (6) 
Now under price competition, given 01 0 cc <= , firm 1 will win the race to sell inputs to firm 
2. Then for any 2c , firm 1’s total payoff will be. 
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where the first part of the RHS is the profit coming from the final goods market competition 
(see (4)) and the second part is due to input sale at price 2c (see (3)). The optimal 2c  will then 
be solved from  
 
),(max 212 γc
I
c Π  s.t. 02 cc ≤  
 
This leads to the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: Let mc  be the free maximization value of 2c  that maximizes ),( 21 γc
IΠ . Then the 
optimal value of 2c  under input market competition will be: },min{ 0
*
2 ccc m=  where 
)(
21416
88
42
432
γ
γγ
γγγ
gcm ≡+−
+−−
= . 
Thus under input market competition, firm 1 will charge the unrestricted monopoly price 
)(γg  for inputs, given γ  , if 0)( cg <γ , and will charge the restricted monopoly input price 
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0c  otherwise. Hence with in-house input production (and input market competition), firm 1’s 
payoff will be: 
                
                 c if   ),(
              c if   ),(
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Clearly, γγγ ∀Π≥Π  ),(),( 011 cc
I
m
I
.The payoff of firm 0 is 0, and firm 2’s payoff is derived 
using its payoff function (5) for an appropriate input price.  
 
4. Outsourcing with Technology Transfer 
In this section we examine outsourcing strategy as an alternative to in-house input 
production. Since firm 1 possesses superior input production technology, it is necessary to 
establish first that firm 1 will commit purchasing inputs from firm 0. We have already 
discussed that in our model, with price competition in the input market, technology licensing 
will not occur, because firm 1 cannot commit not to participate in input market competition. 
On the other hand, if firm 1 decides to sell its patent of the superior input production 
technology to firm 0, it acts as a credible commitment not to produce inputs by itself, which 
essentially means that firm 1 will outsource the input production to firm 0 because firm 1 
foregoes the right to produce inputs after patent sale.  
Then under firm 1’s outsourcing strategy associated with patent sale, firm 0 emerges as 
monopoly in the input market and decides the input price optimally. Now, for any price w  
charged by firm 0 for its inputs to both firms, total input demand under price competition is: 
)1)(2(
)1(2
21 γγ +−
−
=+
w
qq . Then the optimal input price charged by firm 0 (which is also the per 
unit production cost of final goods) under outsourcing is: )2/1(* =w . With this input price, 
firm 0’s profit from input sale is: 
)1)(2(2
1
γγ +− . 
And each of firm 1 and firm 2’s profit from 
the product market operation will be:  
)1()2(4
1
2 γγ
γ
+−
−
                                          (9) 
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Now assume that firm 1 makes a take it or leave it offer of technology sale to firm 0. Then, 
firm 1 will extract all surplus payoff of the independent input supplier from the sale of patent 
of the superior technology. Therefore, firm 1’s total profit under outsourcing strategy will be: 
)1()2(4
35
)1)(2(2
1
)1()2(4
1
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221 γγ
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γγγγ
γ
γ
+−
−
=
+−
+
+−
−
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5. Outsourcing vs. In-house Production 
Now we are in a position to discuss the optimal decision of firm 1 regarding the choice of 
production organization, that is, given any parameter situation, Ω∈),( 0 γc , firm 1 is to 
choose between outsourcing and in-house production of inputs. Consider Figure 1. The 
parameter space defined by Ω  in (6) is given by the area ORST (excluding the boundary 
points). The concave downward sloping line RST represents the equation, )(0 γφ=c . And the 
locus of ),( 0 γc  satisfying )(0 γgc =  is the downward sloping curve line RZMN which 
divides the parameter space into two parts.
9
 Then for all Ω∈),( 0 γc  left of RZMN, the 
optimal input price under input market competition is 
0c  and for all Ω∈),( 0 γc  right of 
RZMN the optimal input price will be mc . 
Now consider the locus of ),( 0 γc  satisfying the relation
10
 )(),(
0
101 γγ Π=Π c
I
, ignoring for 
the time being that ),( 01 γc
IΠ
 
is defined only for mcc ≤0 . The locus is given by the inverted 
U-shaped curve UMV with its peak at )6287.0,4403.0( ** == λcM  (approximately).
11
 We 
can get the following lemma.  
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Lemma 2: Given any 
0c  
, we have: (a) )(),(
0
101 γγ Π<Π c
I
) if (i) either *γγ ≥ , or (ii) ,*γγ <
)(),(c γγ c∃  and ))(),((0 γγ ccc ∉ ; (b) if 
*γγ <  and )](),([0 γγ ccc ∈ , then 
).(),( 0101 γγ Π>Π c
I
 
This states that if 0c
 
be the input price in the input market, outsourcing would be strictly 
preferred to in-house production for large value of γ (i.e., for *γγ ≥ ). Outsourcing would also 
be preferred for a small γ  provided 0c  is small. On the other hand, in-house production 
would yield a larger payoff compared to outsourcing if γ  is not large and 0c  takes an 
intermediate value. 
Note that the above comparison between ),( 01 γc
IΠ  and )(01 γΠ  is valid only for mcc ≤0 . For 
any Ω∈),( 0 γc  to the right of RZMN, the relevant input price is mc  and thus, by comparing 
the profit expressions we find that outsourcing yields greater payoff than in-house production 
for firm 1 if *γγ ≥ =0.6287. Thus, by combining two scenarios with respect to input price, 
we find the curve UMS to clearly divide the parameter space Ω  into two optimal modes 
choice for firm 1. For any Ω∈),( 0 γc  to the left or above the curve UMS in Figure 1 the 
optimal choice for firm 1 is to outsource the input whereas for any Ω∈),( 0 γc  to the right or 
below the curve UMS the optimal choice is in-house input production.  
The reason for above characterization stems from the way the input price is charged under in-
house production. Clearly, under in-house production (and input market competition) the 
optimal input price to be charged by firm 1 will be either 0c  or mc  depending on whether the 
point is on the left of the line RZMN or right of it.. Now consider the points below UMS. For 
all points which lie left of RZMN (i.e., points in the area UMN), the optimal input price (to 
be charged to firm 2) under in-house production is ,0c  hence in-house production (with input 
price 0c ) is preferred to outsourcing. And for the points which are on the right side of the 
curve RZMN (i.e., in the area NMST), the optimal choice of production organization is again 
in-house production, but the optimal input price under in-house production is 
mc . Hence we 
can write our central proposition. 
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Proposition 2: Outsourcing will occur if either the degree of product differentiation is small 
(i.e., γ  is large), or product differentiation is large but technological gap between two input 
producing firms is small. In-house production will be the optimal decision if both the degree 
of product differentiation and technological asymmetry are large.
12
 
Let us try to understand the intuition of the result. First note that as γ  increases, that is as the 
degree of substitution between the products goes up, competition between the product market 
competitors increases. This has negative effect on the competitors’ profits. On the other hand, 
as cost asymmetry between the firms increases, this benefits firm 1 at the cost of firm 2. 
However, if both firms face the same cost and cost increases, the product prices go up 
symmetrically. Then for large γ , the output effect will be smaller compared to the case of 
low γ  (see the expression (1)). Therefore symmetric increase of cost will have relatively 
smaller (negative) effect on profit. Finally, the input price under outsourcing is much larger 
than that under in-house production, that is, },min{)2/1( 0ccm>  (and mc falls as γ  increases). 
Now suppose that γ  is large (i.e., *γγ ≥ ). Then under in-house production, firm 1 will 
charge firm 2 an input price of 
mc  (or, mcc <0 ). Therefore under in-house production, firm 
1’s profit from final goods market as well as the revenue from input sale to firm 2 will not be 
very large. On the other hand, under outsourcing both firms face an input price ½ which is 
much higher than the input price under in-house production. To some extent higher cost 
reduces the intensity of price competition. Moreover, the resulting price will have relatively 
small effect on input demand, hence net revenue from input sale accrued to the independent 
input suppler will be large enough so that although firm 1’s profit from product market 
operation will fall, but when this is added with firm 0’s profit, which firm 1 can grab as 
patent fee, the resulting net payoff of firm 1 becomes larger than the payoff under in-house 
production. Hence for a largeγ , outsourcing will always yield a larger profit than the in-
house production does. 
Now consider low γ  so that products are highly differentiated and the intensity of 
competition is less. This also means that firm 2’s price-quantity will have smaller effect on 
                                                           
12
 To be more formal, outsourcing occurs if either 
*γγ ≥ , or *0 γγ <<  but )(0 γcc < ; when 
*γγ < and 
)(0 γcc ≥ , in-house production will be the outcome. 
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firm 1’s price-quantity. Therefore under in-house production firm 1’s profit from market 
operation is large; and now if 0c  is large, firm 1 can earn a lot of revenue from input sale to 
firm 0 at an input price mc  or 0c , whichever is smaller. So low 0c  means revenue is less. In 
case of outsourcing, as before, both firms will have to buy input at a higher input price. Since 
γ  is small, total output (input demand) is large, hence total revenue from input sale is also 
large. So if 0c  
is small, in-house production generates less profits compared to that under 
outsourcing whereas if 0c  is above a critical level in-house production will dominate 
outsourcing from the perspective of firm 1.      
 
6. Welfare Analysis 
Outsourcing under price competition has interesting welfare implications vis-à-vis the in-
house production (i.e., input market competition). To compare profits and welfare 
meaningfully between these two production organizations we would restrict ourselves to the 
scenarios where outsourcing is profitable over input market competition, that is, either γ  is 
large or 0c  
is small. Let Θ ⊂ Ω be the set of (, ) such that outsourcing is preferred over in-
house production. In Figure 2 (extracted from Figure 1), Θ is given by the area OUMSR. 
In our paper under outsourcing, firm 1 sells out the patent of its input production technology 
to the independent input supplier (firm 0) which emerges as monopoly in the input market to 
sell inputs to the product market competitors, viz., firm 1 and firm 2. Thus firm 1, by its 
outsourcing decision raises production cost for its competitor as well as for itself. In the 
literature on raising rivals’ costs, such an action is beneficial to the firm to the extent this 
hurts the rival. But in our paper, under outsourcing the rival faces less competition, hence, as 
we show below, firm 2 can be better off under certain parameters. This is clearly a distinct 
result in the literature. 
Under input market competition if 2c  be the input price (where  = min {, }), then firm 
2’s payoff is given by (5), that is,   
2
2
2
2
222 4
)2(
2
1
1
1
),( 





−
−
−
−
−
−
=
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γπ
c
cI                                                      
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where mcc ≤2 . Given  γ , ),( 22 γπ c
I  is falling in 2c , with its minimum value being 
)),((2 γγπ m
I c .  And the payoff of firm 2 from outsourcing is 
)1()2(4
1
22 γγ
γ
π
+−
−
=O . We can 
then show that the difference in payoffs )],()([ 22 γπγπ m
IO
c−  is an inverted U-shaped curve in 
γ  over (0,1), and (0,1) 0)],()([ 22 ∈∀>− γγπγπ m
IO
c  . Hence if the input price is high (this is 
of course the case if mcc >0 ), outsourcing benefits firm 2, whatever be the degree of product 
differentiation. On the other hand, when 2c  is very small, (0,1) 0)],()([ 22 ∈∀<− γγπγπ m
IO
c . 
To characterize it further let us consider the locus of (c, γ) satisfying ),()( 222 γπγπ c
IO = given 
by the curve RHN in Figure 2. Then for any (c, γ) ∈ Θ to the right of RHN we have 
),()( 222 γπγπ c
IO > , and to the left of RHN, ),()( 222 γπγπ c
IO < . Thus, we have the following 
proposition.
 
Proposition 3: If the input market competition leads to a high enough  input price, then 
under outsourcing equilibrium the rival firm will always benefit. 
High input price under input market competition means that firm 2, with its high cost of 
production, competes with firm 1 which has 0 cost of production. Under outsourcing input 
price is even higher, but now both the firms face the same high cost of production. This 
benefits firm 2.   
To know the effect of outsourcing on industry profit note that firm 0 is left with zero net 
payoff after firm 1 extracts firm 2’s surplus payoff as the fee for the transferred technology. 
Whenever firm 1 opts for outsourcing, its net payoff must be larger under outsourcing. On the 
other hand, firm 2 may be poorer under outsourcing (it occurs when the input price under 
input market competition is small enough). Therefore, whenever the input price under input 
market competition is sufficiently large, industry profit under outsourcing must go up 
compared to the case of in-house production. To show it more formally, we may directly 
compare industry profits under two production organizations. The industry profit under 
outsourcing is given by  
 Π(γ) = Π
 + π
 = (γ)
(γ)(γ)²)
 
and that under input market competition is 
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 Π(c, γ) = Π
 + π
  
       =

γ
γγγγγγγ 
(γ)(γ)
 
Now consider the locus of (, ) satisfying Π
(γ)=Π(c, γ). In Figure 2, the locus is given by 
the curved line LL′, which divides the space of Θ into two parts such that in the upper part we 
have Π(γ)> Π(c, γ) and in the lower part Π
(γ)<Π(c, γ). In particular, for  =  , we have 
Π(γ)> Π(c, γ)  ∀ > ∗. 
Proposition 4: In outsourcing equilibrium, industry profit under outsourcing is larger for 
higher values of γ , and lower for smaller values of γ . 
We now compare consumers’ surplus between these two production organizations.  
Consumers’ surplus is defined to be the consumers’ gross utility from the goods minus actual 
payment, that is, 221121 ),( qpqpqqUS −−= , 
where 21
2
2
2
12121 ))(2/1()(),( qqqqqqqqU γ−+−+= in our model.  We can then derive the 
consumer surplus under outsourcing and input market competition as follows: 
2)2)(1(4
1
)(
γγ
γ
−+
=OS
 
%&(, ) =
(''''')
(')(')
  
           
 8)²+²7-)(8(1
808076889234
),(
4
23456
γγγ
γγγγγγ
γ
+
++−−++
=m
I cS  
All these expressions are increasing in γ  and it can be shown that 
  cc   )(),(),( m22 <∀>> γγγ
O
m
II ScScS  
The first part of the inequality tells us that as the price in the input market for the firm 2 goes 
up, the consumers’ surplus falls. Then the consumers’ surplus under outsourcing is 
unambiguously less than the input market competition. This is due to the fact that under 
outsourcing the input price is higher than that under input market competition, and as a result, 
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the total output level is lower and output prices are higher under outsourcing than under input 
market competition. 
We are now in a position to compare the overall welfare under these two production 
organizations, where welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ 
surplus. In our paper both under outsourcing and in-house production, in equilibrium all 
production takes place using the most efficient technology. Given that the most efficient 
technology has 0 marginal cost of production, it is then easy to show that welfare expressions 
will be reduced to just the gross utility of the consumers, that is,  
             (() = )(*
 + *
) = (+')
(')(')²
  
For mc≤2c , 
 (&(, ) = )(*
& + *
& ) 
=
(3c − 4c − 2c − 4c + 6c + 8c − 8c + 4 + 6 − 18 − 16 + 24)
2(1 − ²)(4 − ²)²
 
   (&(, ) =  
(''+''4'5'6'7)
(')(+'')²
 
It can be shown that γγγ ∀>−   0)(),( Om
I WcW . Further,  (&(, ) > (&(, ) for all 
 < . 
 Hence, we have the following result. 
Proposition 5: Strategic outsourcing in our model reduces both consumers’ welfare and  
overall welfare.
13
  
This is indeed an important result because it raises serious policy concern. Whenever 
outsourcing occurs with a view to reaping benefits of lower input cost, it should enhance 
profits, as well as consumers’ benefit. In our case outsourcing occurs even when in-house 
production is cheaper. Here outsourcing occurs to have a strategic gain. Under this situation 
consumers suffer due to higher final goods prices. In fact the apparently beneficial 
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 See also Mukherjee and Tsai (2010) and Kabiraj and Sinha (2011) for welfare reducing outsourcing in a 
Cournot set up. 
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technology transfer in a vertically related industry may have an ulterior motive for firm 1 not 
to participate in the input market competition which reduces social welfare. Typically, the 
competition authorities in most countries though have very detailed guidelines and 
restrictions for vertical mergers but vertical technology transfer is always encouraged. It 
should be noted that under certain parameter configurations even firm 2 gains under 
outsourcing and thus even the rival firm would be interested in the strategic outsourcing for 
firm 1 to happen and would not raise any objection to the competition authority regarding this 
behavior of the outsourcing firm that leads to the monopoly in the input market. Thus, our 
model demonstrates that a close scrutiny by the competition authority is desirable even in 
cases when the technology transfer from the final goods producers to input producers 
happens as it might have an implicit motive for not producing the input in-house, and as a 
result, ultimately the economy suffers.  
 
7. Discussion 
In this section we consider some variation of our assumptions and see their effects. 
1. In our model we have assumed that firm 1 has low cost input production technology.  
Suppose, on the contrary, that firm 0 has technological advantage over firm 1 (i.e. 100 cc <≤
). In such a scenario, clearly firm 1 has no scope of transferring its technology. It still has the 
option of outsourcing or in-house production purely based on the consideration of cost 
minimization. Given the price competition in the input market, the prevailing price would be 
, and firm 0 would be able to serve the entire input demand that comes to the input market. 
In such a situation firm 1 is indifferent between outsourcing (i.e., buying input from the 
market) and in-house production. This means, there is no strategic advantage of outsourcing 
for firm 1. One can ask whether there could be technology licensing or sale of patent from 
firm 0 to firm 1. Note that technology sale to firm 1 is equivalent to the acquisition of firm 0 
by firm 1, and in that case firm 1 would have the option to foreclose firm 2 from supplying 
input.
14
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 See Arya et al. (2008, IJIO) in this context. 
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2. Our analysis is based on the assumption that firm 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for its 
technology sale. A natural question is whether a bargaining between the two parties on the 
amount of payment would make any qualitative difference to the results derived in the paper. 
Since bargaining over the fixed payment does not change the choice of input price, our 
analysis should hold as it is. The only difference is that the overall profit from the option of 
outsourcing would fall by the amount that would be appropriated by firm 0. As a result, the 
parameter zone for which the outsourcing would be preferred would shrink, unless the 
bargaining power of firm 0 is so high that firm1 would do better by not choosing that option 
for all parameter values.  
3. Next consider the scenario when there are more than one independent input supplier. In 
this case technology licensing to one or more firms will not be possible due to the 
commitment problem of input market competition. However, sale of patent rights of the 
technology to one input supplier is possible, but the equilibrium price in the input market 
would then be 0c  and the firm which would buy the patent would serve the input market. 
However, firm 1 could then extract (
10 cc − ) price-cost margin per unit of input demand. By 
in-house production firm 1, in fact, would do better because since its own cost of production 
would be low (i.e., c1) and the profit from selling input to firm 2 would remain the same. 
Thus, it is easy to understand that by simply producing the input in-house and then by selling 
the input to its rival at the cost price of the other input suppliers, firm 1 does better than 
outsourcing.  
4. Finally, consider the scenario when the product market is characterized by Cournot 
competition. In our earlier paper (Kabiraj and Sinha (2011)) we have considered quantity 
competition with homogeneous goods. It is shown that outsourcing occurs if the 
technological gap between two input producing firms is small. As the technological 
advantage of firm 1 increases, in-house production becomes more and more attractive, 
because earning from input sale will be larger and firm 1 will have more competitive 
advantage in the product market. To the extent products are differentiated, product market 
competition is relaxed. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown the possibility that although a firm possesses a superior input 
producing technology, it outsources the key input from outside at a much higher price than its 
in-house production cost under some parametric configurations. More specifically, the 
outsourcing occurs if either the degree of product differentiation is low or the technological 
gap between the in-house input production by the efficient firm and that by the outside input 
supplier is not large. Outsourcing leads to high input price, which softens the competition in 
the final good market. We have introduced the issue of technology transfer in the outsourcing 
literature and provided a new strategic reason for outsourcing, which is hitherto not 
recognized in the literature.  
 
We have analyzed the problem in a setting where the integrated firm competes in the final 
goods market with its rival which is dependent on the input market for inputs, and there is an 
independent input producer owning an inferior input producing technology. The integrated 
firm under outsourcing sells off the patent of its input production technology to the 
independent input producing firm and thereby it credibly commits to purchase inputs from 
the independent input supplier which emerges as a monopolist in the input market. This raises 
not only the production cost of the outsourcing firm but also that of the rival. However, by 
transferring its technology the firm captures the surplus profit of the input supplier by means 
of a fee. The higher input price in turn reduces product market competition. The higher input 
price and the resulting lower industry output under outsourcing reduce both the social welfare 
and the consumers’ welfare, although there are situations when the industry profit goes up. 
More interestingly, the competing rival firm which now faces a higher production cost under 
outsourcing can come up with a higher profit. This happens when the final goods of the firms 
are close substitutes and the technological gap between the input producing firms is relatively 
large. This finding has significant implication for competition policy in the context of 
outsourcing and technology transfer. As it is evident from our result, all producers under 
outsourcing can benefit, but the social welfare falls. Our paper, therefore, calls for a closer 
scrutiny of technology transfer for input production.  
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  Figure 2: Profits and welfare comparison under outsourcing vis-à-vis in-house production    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
